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Abstract. CAPTCHAs are a standard security mechanism used on
many websites to protect online services against abuse by automated pro-
grams, or bots. The purpose of a CAPTCHA is to distinguish whether
an online transaction is being carried out by a human or a bot. Unfor-
tunately, to date many existing CAPTCHA schemes have been found
to be vulnerable to automated attacks. It is widely accepted that state-
of-the-art in text-based CAPTCHA design requires that a CAPTCHA
be resistant against segmentation. In this paper, we examine CAPTCHA
usability issues and current segmentation techniques that have been used
to attack various CAPTCHA schemes. We then introduce the design of a
new CAPTCHA scheme that was designed based on these usability and
segmentation considerations. Our goal was to also design a text-based
CAPTCHA scheme that can easily be used on increasingly pervasive
touch-screen devices, without the need for keyboard input. This paper
also examines the usability and robustness of the proposed CAPTCHA
scheme.
Keywords: text-based CAPTCHA, segmentation resistance, optical character
recognition
1 Introduction
CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and
Humans Apart) are essentially automated reverse Turing tests that are com-
monly used by online services to distinguish whether an online transaction is
being carried out by a human or an automated program, i.e. a bot [24]. Since its
inception, many diverse CAPTCHA schemes have been proposed, and to date,
CAPTCHAs have become a standard Internet security mechanism for deterring
automated attacks by bots and other malicious programs. Of the different types
of CAPTCHAs (e.g. text-based, image-based, audio-based) that are currently
used in practice, text-based CAPTCHAs are the most prevalent form in use.
Chellapilla et al. [12] attribute the popularity and pervasiveness of text-based
⋆ This work is supported by ARC Future Fellowship FT0991397.
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CAPTCHAs to its human friendliness, intuitiveness, ease of use, low implemen-
tation cost, etc. In general, a traditional text-based CAPTCHA challenge con-
sists of a word or a random sequence of characters, which may consist of letters
and/or digits, that are embedded within an image. The user’s task is to solve
the CAPTCHA challenge by entering the appropriate sequence of characters in
the correct order.
Unfortunately, while there are numerous existing CAPTCHA schemes that
are currently deployed on a vast number of websites, many of these schemes
have been found to be insecure. The vulnerability of these schemes stem from
various design flaws that can be exploited to break these CAPTCHAs. Over
the years, researchers have documented many techniques that can be used to
break a variety of CAPTCHA schemes at high success rates [1, 3, 4, 7, 13, 16, 19,
21, 20, 28, 29]. Furthermore, attacks against CAPTCHA schemes are not only
limited to traditional text-based CAPTCHAs, as techniques to break other
forms of CAPTCHAs have also been documented. These include techniques
for breaking animated CAPTCHAs [23, 27], 3D-based CAPTCHAs [22], image-
based CAPTCHAs [31], audio-based CAPTCHAs [5], etc. As such, the design
of a CAPTCHA scheme that is robust against automated attacks is an impor-
tant and open research problem. In addition, the challenge of designing a secure
CAPTCHA scheme is further complicated by the fact that not only must the
resulting CAPTCHA be secure against automated attacks, it must also be easily
usable by a human.
This paper presents the design of a new CAPTCHA scheme along with a
discussion on the security and usability of the proposed scheme. It is widely ac-
cepted that state-of-the-art in CAPTCHA design requires that a CAPTCHA be
segmentation-resistant [1, 12], as once a CAPTCHA can be segmented into its
constituting characters, the scheme is essentially deemed to be broken [11]. In
this paper, we first examine CAPTCHA usability issues and current segmenta-
tion techniques that have been used to attack a variety of existing CAPTCHAs,
in order to identify the various factors that must be considered when designing
a robust CAPTCHA scheme. This will then be followed by a discussion on the
design of our proposed scheme in relation to these usability and segmentation
considerations. In addition, this paper presents the results of a user study that
was conducted to ascertain the usability of the proposed CAPTCHA scheme,
followed by an analysis on the robustness of the scheme.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we present and discuss the design of a
new text-based CAPTCHA scheme that is robust against current segmentation
techniques. The proposed CAPTCHA scheme is also usable on touch-screen
interfaces, without the need to enter text via a physical or on-screen keyboard.
Our proposed approach alters the traditional challenge posed by conventional
text-based CAPTCHAs in which the user’s task is to answer the question of
“What is the text?”, into a question of “Where is the text?”. Hence, the user’s
task is to recognize and identify the locations of characters in the CAPTCHA
challenge. Furthermore, this paper outlines and examines the various usability
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and security issues that must be considered in the design of a robust CAPTCHA
scheme.
2 Background
2.1 Usability versus Security
The fundamental requirement of a practical CAPTCHA scheme necessitates that
humans must be able to solve the CAPTCHA challenges with a high degree
of success, while the likelihood that a computer program can correctly solve
them must be very small. This tradeoff between the usability and security of
a CAPTCHA scheme is a hard act to balance. Security considerations push
designers to increase the difficulty of the CAPTCHA scheme, while usability
requirements compel them to make the scheme only as difficult as they need to
be, but still be effective in deterring automated abuse. These conflicting demands
have resulted in the ongoing arms race between CAPTCHA designers and those
who try to break them [10, 15].
The design of a robust CAPTCHAmust capitalize on the difference in natural
human ability and the capabilities of current computer programs [10]. This is
a challenging task because on one hand, computing technology and algorithms
that can be used to solve CAPTCHAs are constantly evolving and improving
(e.g. Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software), while on the other hand,
humans must rely on their inherent abilities and are unlikely to get better at
solving CAPTCHAs. In addition, it has been shown that several key features
that are commonly employed to increase the usability of CAPTCHA schemes
can easily be exploited by computer programs.
The use of color is a major factor that has to be considered in CAPTCHA
design. Color is used in CAPTCHAs for a variety of reasons. From a usability
perspective, color is a strong attention-getting mechanism, it is appealing and
can make CAPTCHA challenges interesting, appropriate use of color can facili-
tate recognition and comprehension of a CAPTCHA, and so on [2]. However, it
has been shown that the imprudent use of color can have a negative impact on
both CAPTCHA usability and security [1, 30].
To aid usability, text-based CAPTCHA challenges that are based on dictio-
nary words are intuitive and easier for humans to solve because humans find
familiar text easier to perceive and read [25]. However, CAPTCHA challenges
that are based on language models are susceptible to dictionary attacks. Rather
of trying to recognize individual characters, which may be difficult if the charac-
ters are overly distorted and/or overlapping, researchers have successfully used
holistic approaches to recognize entire words for CAPTCHA schemes that are
based on language models [4, 21].
Instead of using actual dictionary words, it is possible to take advantage of
text familiarity using “language-like” strings. Phonetic text or Markov dictionary
strings are pronounceable strings that are not words of any language. Experi-
ments have shown that humans perform better when solving CAPTCHAs with
4 Vu Duc Nguyen, Yang-Wai Chow and Willy Susilo
pronounceable strings in contrast to CAPTCHAs which contain purely random
characters [25]. Nevertheless, the disadvantage of using this approach is that cer-
tain characters (i.e. vowels) will appear at higher frequencies in pronounceable
strings compared to other characters. The higher frequencies of certain charac-
ters makes the resulting CAPTCHA more vulnerable to attacks.
In addition, for usability purposes text-based CAPTCHAs should avoid the
use of confusing digits and letters like the digit ‘0’ and the letter ‘O’, the digit ‘1’
and the letter ‘l’, etc. Confusing character combinations like ‘W’ and ‘VV’, ‘m’
and ‘rn’, etc. should also be avoided. Furthermore, if letter case is important,
then confusing characters include upper and lower case pairs like ‘S’ and ‘s’, ‘Z’
and ‘z’, etc. [30].
2.2 Segmentation Resistance
Chellapilla et al. [11, 13] demonstrated that machine learning algorithms can
successfully be used to break a variety of different CAPTCHA schemes. In doing
so, they also showed that computers can outperform humans at the task of
recognizing individual characters. The task of solving a text-based CAPTCHA
consists of two main challenges; namely, a segmentation challenge, followed by
a recognition challenge. The segmentation challenge refers to the identification
and separation of a sequence of characters into its constituting characters in the
correct order, and the recognition challenge involves recognizing the individual
characters. As such, it follows that once a computer program can adequately
reduce a CAPTCHA to the problem of recognizing individual characters, the
CAPTCHA is essentially broken. Hence, it is widely accepted that a secure
CAPTCHA scheme must be designed to be segmentation-resistant [1, 10].
Broad classifications of three of the mainstream segmentation-resistant meth-
ods that are currently employed by a number of CAPTCHA schemes to deter
segmentation, as defined by Bursztein et al. [7], are described as follows:
– Background confusion: CAPTCHA schemes that use this approach to
prevent segmentation attempt to blend the CAPTCHA text with the back-
ground. There are three main ways of achieving this; namely, by using a
complex background image, by using a background with very similar col-
ors to the text, or by adding noise. Some CAPTCHA schemes employ a
combination of these techniques.
– Using lines: In this approach, random line(s) that cross over multiple char-
acters are drawn over the CAPTCHA text. This is done to help prevent
segmentation because characters in the CAPTCHA challenge are connected
together by the lines.
– Collapsing: This approach typically involves removing the space between
characters, tilting characters and/or overlapping them, which in effect crowds
the characters together. The notion behind this approach is to make segmen-
tation difficult because the characters are either very close or joined together.
While this is considered to be the most secure anti-segmentation mechanism,
often design flaws in the CAPTCHA scheme allow attackers to exploit these
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flaws in order to perform segmentation [7]. Some of these attacks are de-
scribed in the next section.
2.3 CAPTCHA Segmentation Techniques
While it is widely accepted that a robust CAPTCHA scheme must be designed to
be segmentation-resistant, many existing schemes that adopt anti-segmentation
mechanisms have in fact been found to be insecure. This is mainly due to certain
design flaws in the scheme that can be exploited by the attacker to segment the
CAPTCHA. Over the years, researchers have documented a variety of different
techniques that can be used to segment various CAPTCHA schemes. Among
others, several key segmentation techniques are described as follows:
– De-noising algorithms: De-noising techniques are mainly used to remove
random noise from a CAPTCHA. Of the various de-noising techniques that
have been proposed over the years, the Markov Random Field technique,
a.k.a. Gibbs algorithm [18], has been found to be very effective [7]. The algo-
rithm works by computing the energy of each pixel based on its surroundings
and removing pixels that have an energy below a certain threshold. This is
performed iteratively until there is no more pixels to remove.
– Histogram-based segmentation: Histogram-based segmentation is a pop-
ular CAPTCHA segmentation technique that projects a CAPTCHA’s pixels
to their respective X or Y coordinates [3, 7, 19, 28, 29]. By producing a his-
togram of the number of pixels in the X or Y dimension, in general, sections
that contain a large pixel count contain characters, while sections with a
low pixel count are potential positions that can be used to segment the
characters. For CAPTCHAs where the characters are only joined slightly
or connected using small lines, this method is effective in segmenting the
CAPTCHA. In other CAPTCHA attacking methods, this technique is effi-
cient in separating groups of characters or potential groups prior to the use
of other segmentation techniques.
– Color Filling Segmentation (CFS): The basic idea behind this technique
is identify a foreground color pixel (i.e. a pixel with a color associated with
the text) and to trace all the neighboring pixels with the same color which
are connected to this pixel, in effect performing a flood fill algorithm, to
identify a chunk of connected pixels. This process is repeated until all chunks
in a CAPTCHA have been identified [3, 29]. The end result of using this
method is that an attacker can identify individual characters or groups of
characters. This method is often used in conjunction with other segmentation
techniques.
– Opportunistic segmentation: This technique relies on making educated
guesses based on prior knowledge about the CAPTCHA scheme. The tech-
nique exploits regular and predictable features of a CAPTCHA scheme in
order to approximate where the segmentation cuts should be. For example,
CAPTCHA schemes that use a fixed number of characters per challenge,
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where characters are usually placed at certain fixed locations, and all char-
acters have roughly the same width, are susceptible to opportunistic segmen-
tation. The reason for this is because it is easy to make an educated guess
as to where the segmentation cuts are likely to occur [7, 10].
– Segmentation based on patterns and shapes: In this segmentation ap-
proach, attackers try to identify certain patterns and shapes that typically
characterize some characters. For example, characters like ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘d’, ‘e’,
‘g’, ‘o’, ‘p’, ‘q’ all contain loops or circular regions, characters like ‘i’, ‘j’,
‘l’ typically consist of small vertical blocks of pixels, etc. [3, 16]. Once these
patterns are determined, these particular features can be identified in the
CAPTCHA which in turn allows the attacker to ascertain appropriate loca-
tions to segment the text.
The techniques described here are some generic methods that have been
adopted to attack a number of different CAPTCHA schemes. There are also
other specialized segmentation methods that have been used to attack spe-
cific CAPTCHA schemes [1, 28]. While to date there is no comprehensive seg-
mentation solution that can be used to break all CAPTCHA schemes, many
CAPTCHA segmentation attacks use a combination and/or variations of the
techniques described above.
3 Design of the Proposed CAPTCHA Scheme
Many of the existing CAPTCHA schemes that adopt anti-segmentation mech-
anisms have actually been broken through the use of using various segmen-
tation techniques, including those described in the previous section. As such,
in designing a CAPTCHA scheme, it is imperative to examine the use of anti-
segmentation mechanisms and to consider the resulting CAPTCHA’s robustness
against current segmentation techniques. Since a CAPTCHA scheme’s robust-
ness is determined by the cumulative effects of its design choices [10], we will
discuss the reasons and security issues that were considered in the design of our
proposed CAPTCHA scheme.
In general, the use of background confusion techniques as a security mecha-
nism has been deemed to be insecure. For one thing, human usability considera-
tions require that the text stand out from the rest of the background, otherwise
a human will not be able to adequately solve the CAPTCHA, and for this rea-
son it is likely that any background can be processed, filtered and removed. It
has therefore been recommended that backgrounds only be used for cosmetic
purposes [7]. In addition, using lines to connect characters as a segmentation-
resistant technique has also been found to be inadequate in preventing the re-
sulting CAPTCHA from being segmented. This is because there are a variety of
techniques that can efficiently detect and/or remove lines, for example, through
the use of line detection algorithms such as the Hough transform [17], erosion
and dilation techniques [26], as well as histogram-based segmentation techniques.
Collapsing techniques such as crowding and overlapping characters together
are considered to be the most secure anti-segmentation approach to date. How-
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ever, an increasing number of CAPTCHA scheme that have been designed with
these techniques have been successfully broken because attackers have managed
to exploit design flaws in the various schemes [3, 7]. One of the reasons for this
is due to the fact that current text-based CAPTCHAs crowd and overlap char-
acters in the horizontal dimension only. This has allowed attackers to identify
predictable features in the CAPTCHA schemes and to approximate where the
segmentation cuts should occur.
In this paper, we propose the design of a text-based CAPTCHA scheme
that is robust against current segmentation techniques. One of our goals was to
also design a scheme that can easily be used on the increasingly popular and
pervasive touch-screen devices, without having to rely on the need to input text
using a physical or on-screen keyboard. As such, unlike conventional text-based
CAPTCHAs which deal with the question of “What is the text?”, our approach
alters this into the question of “Where is the text?”. Examples of our proposed
CAPTCHA scheme are depicted in Figure 1.
(a) Colored version (b) Black and white version
Fig. 1. Examples of the proposed CAPTCHA scheme.
There are two slightly different versions of our proposed scheme. Figure 1(a)
shows an example of a colored version of the proposed CAPTCHA, while Figure
1(b) shows a black and white version. Note that the use of color in our scheme
is not for any security reasons, but rather it is primarily used for reasons of
usability. This is in line with recommendations that color be used in CAPTCHAs
for usability rather than for security [2]. The colored version of our scheme
was implemented to ascertain whether or not it would facilitate human visual
perception, by making it easier for humans to distinguish characters from the
background, instead of having to solely rely on the outlines of characters. To
help answer this question, a user study was conducted and the findings of the
experiment are discussed in Section 4.1.
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For each CAPTCHA in our proposed scheme, a user is provided with a chal-
lenge character set (the list of characters at the bottom of the CAPTCHA)
and an image that contains these specific characters, along with a whole lot
of other non-relevant characters. To solve the CAPTCHA, the user’s task is to
find the locations of the characters provided in the challenge character set in
the image, then drag-and-drop each challenge character onto the correct char-
acter in the image. This can easily be done using a mouse, a pointing device
or on a touch-screen. Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) show examples of an incor-
rect answer and a correct answer respectively1. Note that the correct characters
in the CAPTCHA are only highlighted after the solution has been submitted.
Drag-and-drop CAPTCHAs are not new and have previously been proposed,
for example, for identifying images of 3D text objects [9]. Others have proposed
clickable CAPTCHAs for mobile devices [14].
(a) An incorrect solution (b) A correct solution
Fig. 2. Example answers.
The design of the proposed CAPTCHA scheme mainly relies on the collapsing
technique for preventing segmentation. However, unlike conventional text-based
CAPTCHAs, it can be seen from the examples shown in Figures 1 and 2 that
our approach not only crowds, tilts and overlaps characters in the horizontal
dimension, it also does this in the vertical dimension. In addition, our approach
uses many more characters than is actually contained in the challenge character
set. For conventional CAPTCHAs that adopt the crowding characters together
approach, each character only has a maximum of two neighboring left and right
characters that it can overlap with. Our approach allows for center characters to
overlap with a maximum of eight neighboring characters. Obviously, characters
at the sides have less neighboring characters. As such, it can easily be seen that
1 Animated examples depicting user interaction with the proposed scheme can be
found at: http://www.uow.edu.au/∼wsusilo/CAPTCHA/newCAPTCHA.html
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our approach effectively prevents segmentation techniques like histogram-based
segmentation, color filling segmentation or methods that try to identify character
patterns and shapes to determine where the text should be segmented, because
the text cannot simply be segmented using single lines.
The challenge character set in the proposed scheme consists of random char-
acters instead of dictionary words, and is therefore not affected by dictionary
attacks. Rather than using a fixed number of characters per challenge, the num-
ber of characters in the challenge set can be randomized. Furthermore, for all
characters in the image, their rotation angles, positions and sizes, as well as the
number of characters, can all be randomized within a certain range of values.
This prevents other segmentation techniques like opportunistic segmentation,
because the randomization makes it difficult to predict where individual charac-
ters are located. Also, since color in our scheme is not used for security, attackers
cannot use color filtering to identify the locations of individual characters in the
image.
From a usability perspective, the proposed CAPTCHA scheme is based on
Gestalt principles of visual perception. By removing the outlines of characters
wherever they overlap in the image to deter segmentation, a human can still
solve the CAPTCHA because humans perceive objects as a whole and the vi-
sual system fills in the missing areas. Our implementation was programmed to
avoid the use of confusing character combinations within the same CAPTCHA
challenge. In our scheme, each unique character only occurs once per challenge.
Also, although the characters are crowded together, unlike many conventional
text-based CAPTCHAs which rely on character warping or distortion to de-
ter automated attacks, the characters in our approach are not distorted. This
is because the security mechanism of our approach does not rely on character
warping or distortion, which in turn makes the task of recognizing undistorted
characters easier for humans. Only upper case letters and digits are used in the
current implementation.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 User Study
User studies with human participants are the best method of establishing the
human-friendliness of a CAPTCHA scheme [10]. As such, a pilot user study
was conducted to determine the usability of the proposed CAPTCHA scheme.
The study was also done to ascertain whether the use of color in one of the
CAPTCHA versions would make a significant difference for a human. A total of
42 volunteers, 33 male and 9 female, took part in the experiment. Participants
were aged between 18 and 58 (average ∼32.9, standard deviation ∼1.05). None
of the participants had ever seen or had any prior knowledge about the proposed
CAPTCHA scheme.
Method. For the study, a total of 30 CAPTCHA challenges were generated.
Of this, 15 were the colored version and the other 15 were the black and white
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version. For each version, the challenge character set consisted of 3 characters
for 7 of the CAPTCHAs, while the challenge character set for the remaining 8
CAPTCHAs consisted of 4 characters. The order in which the CAPTCHAs were
presented to the participants was randomized. In order to compare results, the
same experimental conditions were maintained for all participants. Hence, each
participant was required to solve the same set of 30 CAPTCHAs.
Before the experiment, each of the participants was given instructions about
the experimental task and what they were required to do. Their task was simply
to view each challenge and solve the CAPTCHA using a mouse. The duration
of the experiment was designed to be short to avoid participants loosing concen-
tration. The total time required by each participant to complete the experiment
varied between individuals, but took no longer than 15 minutes. During the ex-
periment, we recorded the time taken by each user to complete each CAPTCHA
challenge as well as all their answers. Participants were not provided with any
information regarding the correctness of their answers. At the end of the exper-
iment, participants were also given a post-experiment questionnaire that con-
tained questions about their subjective opinions in relation to the usability of
the proposed CAPTCHA scheme.
Results. Table 1 shows the results of the experiment. It shows the difference
in accuracy and average completion time between the colored version of the
CAPTCHA and the black and white version. For good usability and to avoid
users getting annoyed, Chellapilla et al. [10] state that the human success rate
of a good CAPTCHA should approach 90%. It can be seen from the user study
results that the success rate of both versions of our proposed CAPTCHA satisfies
this benchmark.
Table 1. Average completion time and the success rates
Accuracy (%) Average Time (s)
Colored version 96.35 18.97
Black and white version 93.81 26.24
In addition, the experimental results suggest that the use of color has an
effect on the overall usability of the CAPTCHA scheme. In Table 1, one can see
that the accuracy for the colored version was higher than the black and white
version. However, a Chi-square test did not reveal a significant difference. The
results also show a difference in the average completion times. Upon further
analysis, a t-test showed a significant difference in the average completion time
for the black and white version (M = 26.24s, SD = 18.26s) and the colored
version (M = 18.97s, SD = 7.60s); t(841) = 9.22, p < 0.001. This suggests
that perceptually the use of color to distinguish characters from the background
makes the CAPTCHA easier for a human to solve. Table 2 shows the breakdown
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of average completion times based on the number of characters per challenge.
Not surprisingly, the more challenge characters in a CAPTCHA, the longer it
took participants to solve the CAPTCHA.
Table 2. Average completion time based on the number of challenge characters
Average Time (s)
3 characters 4 characters
Colored version 17.70 21.52
Black and white version 20.67 31.12
It should be noted that overall the time taken by participants to complete our
proposed CAPTCHA scheme appears to be longer than that required to solve
other image CAPTCHAs. In a large scale evaluation study by Bursztein et al.
[6] where they tested a variety of CAPTCHA schemes, they reported an average
solving time of 9.8 seconds for image CAPTCHAs and 28.4 seconds for audio
CAPTCHAs. The lengthy duration required to solve our proposed CAPTCHA,
especially the black and white version, is probably due to two factors. First, users
have to search the image in order to identify the locations of the appropriate
characters. A task that appears to be more difficult in the case of the black and
white version. Second, users may spend more time when trying to accurately
drag-and-drop characters to the appropriate locations in the image, compared
to traditional text-based CAPTCHAs where they would simply input text via a
keyboard. Figure 3 is an example of a plot which shows the locations of where
the participants’ “dropped” each of the individual challenge characters when
attempting to solve the CAPTCHA.
In one of the questions on the post-experiment questionnaire, participants
were asked to rate the ease of use of the proposed CAPTCHA scheme using a 7-
point Likert scale, with 1 being very difficult to use and 7 being very easy to use.
The average participant response to this question was 5.14. When asked to rate
the usability of the proposed CAPTCHA scheme as compared to other existing
CAPTCHAs that they had used in the past, the average response was 4.65,
where 1 was much harder to use and 7 was much easier to use. This indicates
that in general, the majority of participants had a positive opinion about the
usability of the proposed scheme.
4.2 Security
Figure 4 shows example images resulting from a number of typical techniques
that are often used to attack CAPTCHA schemes. The CAPTCHA challenge it-
self is shown in Figure 4(a). Figure 4(b) shows the CAPTCHA image’s skeleton.
Skeletonization is a process that is used to thin a shape while preserving the gen-
eral pattern of the shape. Skeleton images have been used to attack CAPTCHAs
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Fig. 3. Example showing the locations of where participants’ “dropped” the respective
challenge characters in the CAPTCHA.
as the skeleton thins the characters to a single pixel thickness, which may poten-
tially be used to identify geometric features of the characters [3]. It can be seen
in the figure that because characters in the proposed CAPTCHA are overlapped
in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions, the skeleton image does not re-
sult in useful information that can be used to segment or to identify individual
characters. Figure 4(c) shows the results of processing the CAPTCHA using a
Canny edge detection filter [8]. In the proposed CAPTCHA scheme, the edge
detection filter merely highlights the outlines of the overlapping characters, but
does not facilitate the task of separating the characters.
Histogram-based segmentation is a commonly used approach that projects
CAPTCHA pixels in the X and Y dimensions in order to identify potential loca-
tions to segment the text. Figure 4(d) shows the results of histogram projections
that project the pixels that form the outlines of the overlapping characters in
the X and Y dimensions respectively. X and Y histogram projections of the in-
ternal regions of the characters are shown in Figure 4(e). It can be seen that
both histogram projection approaches do not provide enough information that
can be used to adequately segment the CAPTCHA challenge.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the design of a new CAPTCHA scheme that was de-
veloped to be segmentation-resistant. To achieve this, this paper first examined
the various usability and security issues that have to be considered when design-
ing a robust CAPTCHA scheme, then described how the proposed CAPTCHA
scheme satisfied these issues. The CAPTCHA scheme introduced in this paper is
based on the concept of identifying character locations, rather than merely rec-
ognizing characters, and can easily be used on touch-screen devices without the
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(a) CAPTCHA challenge
(b) Skeleton image (c) Edge detection
(d) X and Y histogram projections
of text outlines
(e) X and Y histogram projections
of text regions
Fig. 4. Image processing results on a CAPTCHA challenge.
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need for a keyboard. In addition, this paper also presented the results obtained
from a user study that was conducted to ascertain the usability of the proposed
CAPTCHA scheme.
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